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PREVENTIVE LAW AND FAMILY LAW:
PRE-MARITAL PHASES AND PURPOSES
I. INTRODUCTION
The formal definition of "preventive law," "a branch of law that en-
deavors to minimize the risk of litigation or to secure more certainty as
to legal rights and duties,"' has existed only since 1961,2 and the origin
of preventive law as an identifiable development within the law is trace-
able to 1870.3 This evolution and crystallization of a concept-without-
a-label in less than a century would not appear to embrace a remarkably
protracted length of time; however, such progress is more readily under-
stood when it is realized that this formalization was aided by the legal
professions identification of the movement, and grasp of its objectives, for
an extensive period of time prior to its rapid acceleration toward concreti-
zation after 1870. 4 Lawyers, for many years, have been cognizant of the
"consultive processes in law" which are directed at reducing the need for
the formal aspects of law reflected in trial and appellate procedures 5 and
of the growing emphasis on that part of the law which has both negative
and affirmative goals; that is, the prevention of legal "trouble" and the
achievement of desired legal "results," 6 rather than merely the former.
Estate planning, for example, is typical of preventive law practices that,
for centuries, have been merged into the operative conduct of lawyers
notwithstanding the burgeoning of emphasis on this aspect of the law in
this century. Because of the relative anonymity of its development, "preven-
tive law" has popularly emerged as an appellation rather than a d nIarche,
and the prediction expressed by the movement's most eminent spokesman
that the "periodic legal check-up," 7 a concrete and specific tool of preven-
tive law, would become an integral component of all law office practice
prior to 1960,8 has likewise proved to be somewhat less than accurate.
The "legal check-up" concept is, however, an expanding notion,9 and is
integral to the development of this comment as well as to its methodology.
1. Merriam Webster, New International Dictionary 1798 (3d ed. 1961).
2. Preventive Law Symposium, 38 So. CAL. L. Rgv. 377 (1965).
3. See HURST, THE GROWTH Op AMERICAN LAW 261-62 (1950). See also
Brown, The Law Office - A Preventive Law Laboratory, 104 U. PA. L. Rzv. 940(1956) [hereinafter cited as Brown, The Law Office].
4. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. Rzv. 1222 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn, Some Realism].
For a comprehensive bibliography, see BROWN, PREVENTIVn LAW IN THe LAWY, RING
PROCESS (1963).
5. See Redmount, Attorney Personalities and Some Psychological Aspects of
Legal Consultation, 109 U. PA. L. R4v. 972, 988 (1961).
6. See Habermann, Preventive Law - A Challenge to the Bar, Wis. B. BULL. 7(August, 1966).
7. The phrase was coined and given currency in BROWN, MANUAL OF PREV EN-
TivE LAW 35 (1950). See also Brown, The Law Office 951 n.33.
8. See Brown, The Law Office 951 n.33. See also Brown, The Practice of
Preventive Law, 35 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 45, 47 (1951).
9. See generally Tilles, Understanding the Consultant's Role, 39 Harv. Bus.
Rev. 87 (Nov.-Dec. 1961).
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The purposes of this paper are to show not only that preventive law
should operate in the field of domestic relations law but also that there
is an obligation on not only preventive law lawyers but also on the entire
legal profession to analyze the difficulties which the preventive law move-
ment has encountered, and to attempt to correlate this analysis with
domestic relations law problems; to recommend specific preventive law
objectives in the field of domestic law problems; and, to consider some of
the indirect advantages of commencing and nurturing preventive law
approaches to family law problems. In particular, the recommendation
will be made that a statute be enacted using the "legal check-up" technique.
This statute would require a "pre-marital legal check-up" comprehending
a simultaneous interview between an attorney and the parties planning to
enter into the marital status. The primary function of the lawyer would
be to apprise the couple of the State's interest in their marriage. The
essence of this function would constitute an elaboration of the State's con-
cern for the regularity and integrity of their marriage and an examination
of its legal elements and ramifications, emphasizing, in this latter aspect,
that each will assume a new and different legal status, legal personality,
and legal capacity.
II. RELATIONSHIP OF PREVENTIVE LAW TO DOMESTIC
RELATIONS LAW
Law is a social institution created for the satisfaction of social needs,
and legal history is a record of a continually wider recognizing and satisfy-
ing of human wants or claims or desires through social control; "a more
embracing and more effective securing of social interests."1 0 Because of
the relationship of their profession to society and its components, lawyers,
not unnaturally, have tended to view themselves as "the oldest form of
behavioral scientist."'1 When law is perceived as a means to social ends
rather than as an end in itself, it is self-evident that "before rules [of law]
were facts." 12 Preventive law classifies facts as either "hot" or "cold," the
former referring to current facts of immediate affairs, the latter signifying
the historical facts of a record on appeal.13 Distinguishing facts in this
manner serves a functional purpose related to the dual objective of pre-
ventive law, the control of facts to which legal consequences attach and the
10. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY or LAW 47 (rev. ed. 1954).
11. See Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L. Rtv. 585,
593 (1965). The Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School has stated that:
Lawyers are constantly concerned with behavioral problems. They are called on
for advice by the disturbed and the mentally ill, and they see many problems with
mental health aspects. They need understanding of human conduct, its motivations
and determinants. They need this understanding, not so that they can substitute
for psychiatrists, but to be better counsellors and judges.Quoted in Wels, Psychiatry and the Law in Separation and Divorce, in NEUROtIC
INTERACTION IN MARRIAGE 326-27 (Eisenstein ed. 1956). (Emphasis added.)
12. See Llewellyn, Some Realism 1222.
13. Brown, The Law Office 940-41.
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control of the likelihood of dispute regarding these facts.14 Expressed in
this manner, litigation is broadly viewed as a part of law in which there
has been a breakdown in the practice of preventive law, rather than as
a mere settlement of a dispute; that is, litigation vis-ii-vis preventive law
aims is a remedial legal procedure. Viewed in this light, it is clear that
the approach to legal problems taken by preventive lawyers is necessarily
a priori: Does the event or happening have legal consequences? If so, can
contact with the formal machinery of law - trial and/or appellate pro-
cedures - be avoided?
That marriage is a contract with mutually dependent covenants, 15 but
that divorce is something more than a suit for damages for breach of
contract,' 6 are axioms of law, irrespective of any analytical bases for the
seeming paradox arising from a juxtapositioning of them. Recently the
Supreme Court said in Griswold v. Connecticut:
17
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully en-
during and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an associa-
tion that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions. 8
In relating the rights of married persons to fundamental rights guaranteed
by the first amendment, the Supreme Court was, in one aspect, carrying
forward legal considerations of marriage that have appeared from time
to time before the Court.
In Maynard v. Hill,19 reference to marriage as a civil contract, in
both judicial decisions and scholarly writings, were recognized as con-
venient shorthand methods of indicating that the contract to marry be-
comes executed by its solemnization, with or without an attendant re-
ligious ceremony, so that a "relation" is created, a relation that is an "in-
stitution" of society founded upon consent and contract of the parties.
20
The rights, duties, and obligations of this "social relation," however,
depend not upon the agreement which signifies the relation, but upon "'the
general law of the State, statutory or common, which defines and pre-
scribes those rights ... [which] are of law, not of contract.' "21 Subsequent
decisions of the Court expanded the legal ramifications of this "social
relation" by declaring that both marriage and divorce created a new legal
14. Id. at 942 n.10. The homely classification of facts into "hot" and "cold"
serves a definitional purpose but is also designed to show that the "control" at
which preventive law aims is germane to the practice of law rather than the "control"
sought, for example, by Pavloveans.
15. See, e.g., Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hag. Eccl. 789, 790, 162 Eng. Rep. 755, 756 (1799).
16. See, e.g., Weinstein, Proposed Changes in the Law of Divorce, 27 Mo. L.
Riv. 307, 323 (1962).
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1964).
18. Id. at 486. (Emphasis added.)
19. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
20. Id. at 210-14.
21. Id. at 211.
COMMENTS
3
Falco: Preventable Law and Family Law: Pre-Marital Phases and Purposes
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
"status" 22 which included as a part of its meaning "the regularity and
integrity of the marriage relation. ' 23 Most recently, while striking down
a State antimiscegeneation statute in Loving v. Virginia,2 4 the Court charac-
terized marriage as "one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to
our very existence and survival. '25
Thus, the progression of characterizations of marriage before the
Supreme Court over a period of exactly eighty years has been from civil
contract, to social relation, to status, to association, to basic civil right. 26
The collation of judicial opinion is, however, deceptive. While it would
seem that an orderly body of law on marriage has emerged, the situation
outside of the legal sphere has been drastically different:
The modern trend seems to be to regard marriage as a status only in
the subordinate sense, the relationship being primarily that of con-
tract, which can be abrogated or dissolved and with considerably more
ease than one could extricate one's self from the liabilities arising out
of one of a business relationship.27
It is the difference between the deceptively systematic body of law
on the subject of a basic civil right and the widespread beliefs that mar-
riage is "in short, a social relationship" 28 or a "cultural product ' 29 that
presents a challenge to the preventive lawyer in his attempt to reconcile
the abstract statements of law to the problems of those who live in the
very real world and who compose the clients in a domestic relations case.
The widely accepted legal definition of "status," "that condition of a
person by which the nature of his legal personality and his legal capacities
are determined," 30 is separate and distinct from the definition of "status"
which serve other fields; for example, the sociological. Nevertheless,
despite the fact that by marriage two people pass from one kind of legal
status, the non-marital, 31 into a distinct and different legal status, the
marital, by solemnizing a contract to marry, it has been, and is, asserted
that not only has there not developed a legal approach to these events
which singly and collectively have a legal significance attached, but that
there has not even appeared a legal approach to legal theory in the field
22. E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1944).
23. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1947).
24. 87 Sup. Ct. 1817 (1967).
25. Id. at 1824.
26. In Loving, when the Court described marriage, it appeared to be reaffirming
a definition expressed in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The use
of the phraseology "basic civil rights" in both cases, however, is simply coincidental.
To view Loving as but an affirmance of a prior judicial pronunciamento would be to
discount the panorama of American history in the field of civil rights since 1942 and
to weaken the force of the case itself.
27. McGuire, Civil Law Concerning Marriage, in FUNDAMENTAL MARRIAGE
COUNSMLING 416 (Cavanagh ed. 1963).
28. See GOODP, AFTER DIVORCE 90 (1956).
29. See Montagu, Marriage - A Cultural Perspective, in NEUROTIC INTER-
ACTION IN MARRIAGE 4 (Eisenstein ed. 1956).
30. Cavanagh, Introduction, in FUNDAMENTAL MARRIAGE COUNSELN,'G xvii
(Cavanagh ed. 1963).
31. The non-marital status as a peculiar type of legal status is a concept already
well developed in specialized fields of law; for example, the taxing law.
[VOL. 12
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of family law.3 2 This is so notwithstanding the crises in the family system
that arise due to the act of divorce, an act which itself has legal significance
and legal involvement.3 3 Is such a vacuum, in legal approach and in legal
theory, a proper sphere for preventive law technique, where it is funda-
mental that "the really first stage at which a lawyer may be called upon
to predict ...is ... before the client has 'signed a contract' "?34 If So,
are there worthwhile specific objectives upon which preventive law can
take sight? Or is the legal profession to attempt to preserve the status quo,
and occasionally make a deferential gesture35 as its contribution to the
expanding work being accomplished in family law and family relations?
To phrase such questions is, of course, to exercise in rhetroic, for the legal
profession is well aware that its abstention from contributions in the field
have been productive "of a chaotic situation in domestic relations law
and . . . [of] a mephitic atmosphere prejudicial to the dignity of the legal
profession and the judicial system." 36
III. PRESENT OBSTACLES TO GREATER PREVENTIVE LAW DEVELOPMENT
IN THE FAMILY LAW AREA - A SUGGESTION
Some courts have recently given emphasis to the implementation of
the formal elements of law in order to reconcile parties to a contemplated
divorce proceeding, 37 receiving, thereby, justifiable commendation. These
attempts, however, are not overt resort to the process of preventive law 38
and cannot be cited for the proposition that a legal approach to marital
law problems is not lacking. Legal conciliation procedures in the area of
divorce are a product of "marital illness;"39 a strain in a legal relation-
ship has reached the point that remedial legal measures must be invoked,
and the Family Courts are viewed as a "therapeutic measure" of a "preven-
tive character" whose "primary purpose would be that of salvage."'40 Recon-
ciliation, in the eyes of the law, is a "voluntary resumption of marital
cohabitation in the fullest sense" involving four elements measured by the
legal micrometers: a living together as husband and wife, sexual relations,
joint domicile, and intent of the parties.41 The effect of a reconciliation is
32. See Dean & Kargman, Is There a Legal Conceptual Framework for the
Study of the American Family?, in EMERGING CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS IN FAMILY
ANALYSIS 281 (Nye & Berardo ed. 1966).
33. For a study of the nature of this particular crisis on the family system, see
ZIMMERMAN & CERVANTES, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY (1956).
34. Brown, The Law Office 942 n.10.
35. See, e.g., Bradway, Proposed New Techniques in the Law of Divorce, 28
IOWA L. Rzv. 256, 269 (1943), where the suggestion is offered that a divorce pro-
ceeding should be entitled "In re the dissolution of the ... Family."
36. Furlong, Dual Divorce Decrees and Conciliation in Contemporary Family
Law, 2 WILLAMErTE L.J. 134, 135 (1962).
37. See, e.g., Rail, The King County Family Court, 28 WASH. L. REv. 22 (1953).
38. Because the word "preventive" is susceptible of various meanings, one must
be cautioned and cognizant of the dangers of the utraquistic subterfuge; that is, the
use of a word in both or several of its senses during the same discussion. See Chafee,
The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 381, 387 (1941).
39. See, e.g., Furlong, supra note 36, at 138.
40. McGuire, supra note 27, at 417-18.
41. Clark, Separation Agreements, 28 ROCKY MT. L. Rev. 149, 178-79 (1956).
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the equivalent to a rescission.42 These "preventive" reconciliation measures
are designed to prevent a culmination of the legal proceedings in a divorce
by having the parties to the proceeding resolve their difficulties under the
auspices of a court. In this sense and in only this sense are such pro-
ceedings "preventive" and, as such, are readily distinguishable from the
broader non-remedial twofold purposes of preventive law.43
In a society that values marital stability highly, the decision to divorce
and not merely the fact of divorce is a proper factor for consideration in
the post divorce adjustment study.44 Hence, to recognize the invocation
of legal and judicial machinery at a point when the status is on the verge
of fissure is not the same as saying that any ensuing exertion within the
legal and judicial procedural framework is preventive law. The reconcilia-
tion proceedings are designed to prevent further demands on the formal
components of the legal system. A lawyer's services at this stage are more
mechanical than ameliorative, because the lawyer, himself, is boxed-in
with respect to any attempts by him to resolve the domestic relations
problem which he is about to enter, in medias res.45 Thus, when the point
is reached that conciliatory measures are deemed appropriate or necessary,
the law finds itself at the threshold of a full-blown legal dispute, the
possibility of avoiding or controlling which is an announced objective of
preventive law.46
The difficulties arising from the failure to isolate the legal aspects of
marriage and of divorce are best mirrored in the fact that with one excep-
tion, where it was suggested that marriage annulment litigation could be
prevented in large measure by a state investigation of facts before the
issuance of a marriage license, 47 the proponents of preventive law, them-
selves, have done little more than recognize the area as a proper one for
legal activity and techniques. 48
In this sense, 49 the development of a legal approach to modern prob-
lems of marriage, as there has already developed an approach to divorce,
would per se constitute a valid and rewarding purpose for the preventive
law lawyers.50
42. Id. at 182.
43. See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra.
44. See GODD9, op. cit. supra note 28, at 6. See also text accompanying note 70
infra. In the criminal law field, the process of adjustment is being accorded more
attention and the legal profession is being called upon more to make contributions.
"Adjustment" in this sense is pointed more to true rehabilitation and not merely a
procedural device that hopefully will reduce the number of recidivists.
45. For a more comprehensive discussion, see Baum, A Trial Judge's Random
Reflections on Divorce: The Social Problem and What Lawyers Can Do About It,
6 J. FAMILY L. 61, 70-71 (1966).
46. See generally Brown, The Law Office.
47. Bradway, The Family Watchdog, 86 U. PA. L. Riv. 823 (1938).
48. Brown, The Law Office 942 & n.9.
49. See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text.
50. "The broadest possibilities for preventive practice lie, however, in the vast
fields of property law and contract." Brown, The Law Office 944. Karl Llewellyn,
hardly a master of the understatement, once said, "Contracts in what we may broadly
call family relations do not work out in general as they do in business." Llewellyn,
Some Realism 1240.
[VOL. 12
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IV. LEGAL FACTS FOR A PREVENTIVE LAW PURPOSE
The sine qua non of preventive law is, as has been pointed out,5'
facts of legal significance. In 1910, there was 1 divorce for every 11.4
marriages; in 1965, the divorce rate was 1 in every 3.7 marriages. During
this period the median age for the marrying parties dropped from 24.6
years for the male and 21.2 for the female to 22.8 and 20.6 respectively,52
and the break-up rate for young married people is estimated at one in
three.53 Divorce has been called the "most common kind of civil litigation"
in the United States, constituting almost 40% of pending state court
cases in some areas. 54
The same facts, of course, mean different things to different pro-
fessions. 55 The above facts have presented a thorny area for lawyers
because the attitude has been generated that there are persons more prop-
erly qualified to deal with these facts in order to derive and apply any
meaning from them; namely, the minister, the psychiatrist, the psychologist,
and the sociologist.5 6 This attitude can be ascribed, in part, to charges
made from both sides of the bench that the legal profession has aban-
doned,5 7 or is unfit55 for, treating any of the family law problems innate
in these statistics. Controversy has mistakenly focused on the contention
that lawyers would be unable to take and use such facts for a legitimate
legal purpose without poaching on the preserve of several other professions.
For the lawyer, the aforementioned statistics mean that 1 of every 3
marriages will terminate; that is, 2 people out of every 6 in the class will
begin a legal relationship with a contract and terminate that relationship
by formal legal proceedings that may involve another contract, a property
settlement agreement. During this passage between two formal legal inci-
dents, the two people will have passed through three separate legal statuses,
51. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
52. Dept. of Commerce Statistical Abstract of the United States 46, 62-63 (1966).
In 1965, 1,789,000 marriages were contracted. Ibid.
53. See Baum, supra note 45, at 62.
54. Id. at 74, 75 & n.28.
55. See generally Cavanagh, Introduction, in FUNDAMENTAL MARRIAGE COUN-
SELING (Cavanagh ed. 1963).
56. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 45, at 70-74.
57. See, e.g., Ketcham, supra note 11, at 598.
58. Baum, supra note 45, at 93:
The legal profession can help bring a breakthrough in controlling the divorce
epidemic if a number of things happen:
"If" lawyers learn more about the behavorial sciences in order to appreciate
the knowledge and skills of other disciplines dealing with family conflict.
"If" lawyers will make use of such knowledge and skills by appropriate
referrals to clergymen, psychologists, social workers, medical doctors and,
especially, professionally-trained marriage counselors.
"If" the profession undertakes a program of upgrading the teaching and
practice of family law.
"If" lawyers exhaust the possibility of improving their clients' unhappy
marriages before recommending divorce, and a canon of ethics is adopted to assure
such an effort by each and every attorney.
"If," above all else, the profession can change divorce laws so that adversary
proceedings are deferred until there has been expert diagnosis of family problems
and an opportunity for voluntary therapy.
"If" the profession vigorously supports high quality, voluntary pre-marital
education and counseling.
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the non-marital, the marital, and the divorced; and, they have a 50%,5
chance of creating a fourth status during this interim, the parental. The
children who are the product of the marriage have, as a result of the pro-
creative process, their own legally cognizable status, which the courts will
consider and protect, the "status of dignity."60 In addition, the behavior
patterns of most divorcees disclose that they are later reassimilated to
the marital status.6' And, an increasingly substantial percentage of the
remaining 4 of 6 persons in the class are implementing modernized legal
machinery for reconciliation in which great formality is attached to the
execution of a reconciliation agreement, another contract. 62 The irre-
sistible conclusion, therefore, is that nearly 1 of every 2 persons in the
class will both enter the class and approach leaving or actually leave the
class via legal instruments and legal instrumentalities.
However difficult this :conclusion may be for other professions to
accept, it has particular significance for the legal profession on the issue
of whether there exists a public policy favoring the indissolubility of
marriage to which the strength of legal presumptions can be attached.63
It is an accepted legal truism that "the public policy of one generation may
not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another. '6 4 The
public policy that appears to hold sway in divorce proceedings of today is
that "a reasonable effort, be exerted to determine whether or not the
marriage is in fact terminated," and, if "the marriage is one in legal form
only, it should be terminated." 65 The interest that lawyers have in the
relative ease of separation or divorce in contemporary society and the
public policy that is reflected by the statistics is similar, in some respects,
to that of other professions: "Our concern here is not with whether such
an attitude is 'good' or 'bad'; rather we should note that it is not prevalent
in most cultures but is peculiar to our own."0 6  From this position of
objectivity, it cannot be. denied that these facts constitute a sufficient
number of "law creating events" 67 to' which the purportedly practical
approach of preventive law is aimed. Nor can it be denied that a legal
approach to these legal facts is not only desirable but also necessary if
the traditional gap between a society in flux, and in flux typically faster
than the law, 68 is not to widen beyond acceptable limits.
59. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 16, at 310.
60. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 237 (1944).
61. See GOOD, op. cit. supra note 28, at 207.
62. See, e.g., Furlong, supra note 36, at 141.
63. For the classic articulation of this legally impelling public policy, see Evans
v. Evans, 1 Hag Con. 35, 161 Eng. Rep. 466 (1790). For a consideration of the con-
tinned vitality of this alleged public policy in various sophisticated forms, see, e.g.,
\Vhitmire, Maintenance on Appeal, 10 LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 757 (1944).
64. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930).
65. See Weinstein, supra note 16, at 329.
66. Montagu, supra note 29, at 7. See HARING, MARRIAGE IN TH MODSRN WORLD
132 (1965). It should be noted that in civil law countries, it is considered a mandate
on the law to prevent internal family affairs from too often becoming the subject
of civil-law mediation.
67. See Brown, The Law Office 941 n.7.
68. Llewellyn, Some Realism 1236.
846 [VOL. 12
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V. STATUTORY PRE-MARITAL LEGAL CHECK-UP:
THE NECESSITY
Having reviewed the facts and having discussed the broad purpose of
a preventive law approach in the field of family law, we come now to the
"question of making the facts talk."69 It is a working assumption in many
professions that the United States is a society that values marital stability
highly; the sociologist, for example, considers the divorce rate as an un-
equivocal index of social change that may proceed from either personal
disorganization or from a current social pathology. 70 In a legal context,
in both state7l and federal courts, 72 the permanency of marriage contracts
is of peculiar concern because although marriage and divorce affect per-
sonal rights, they also touch basic interests of society. Thus, it is firmly
embedded in our legal tradition and in our legal institutions that the
State's interest in the family causes the marital status to be three-cornered,
with the State as a third party ;73 and, in the absence of any constitutional
prohibitions, legislation in support of the State's legitimate and vital
interest in maintaining "effective control of the marital status"74 will be
upheld. 75 The judicially recognized substantial state interest in the perma-
nency and integrity of the marital status which can, constitutionally, be
supported by legislation, can lead to an enactment of a technique of pre-
ventive law, the "legal check-up, '76 as a means to effectively assert and
69. See Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counselling and Advocacy
Especially In Commercial Transactions, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 183 (1946) (herein-
after cited as Llewellyn, The Modern Approach]. (Emphasis added.)
70. See, e.g., GOODE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 6-10.
71. See, e.g., De Ryt v. De Ryt, 6 Ohio St. 2d 31, 40, 215 N.E.2d 698, 706 (1966).
72. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1944).
73. See BisHoP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE §§ 229, 231 (6th ed. 1881) ; HILL,
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 537 (1942) ; KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE §§ 1.07,
1.08 (2d ed. 1945). See generally Connolly, Divorce Proctors, 34 B.U.L. REv. 1,
6-9 (1954).
74. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 547 (1947).
75. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 87 Sup. Ct. 1817 (1967) ; Ohio ex rel. Popovici
v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 384 (1930). Under our federal system, the domestic relations
of husband and wife are matters reserved to the State, but not exclusively because
of the demands of equal protection and due process, Ibid. See also Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 233 (1944).
76. This phrase serves as a favorite shorthand description for preventive lawyers.
See text at p. 840 supra. Its usage is continued in this paper but a caveat is neces-
sary. In business, where the employment of a consultant by corporate executives
for both preventive and corrective reasons is relatively fully developed, the analogy
of a doctor-patient relationship has been explored. The analogy has been found to
be misleading in three areas: the way in which the "patient" is identified; the
responsibility for diagnosis; and, the degree of participation of the client in formulat-
ing and carrying out the "therapy." See Tilles, Understanding the Consultant's Role,
39 Harv. Bus. Rev. 87, 90 (Nov.-Dec. 1961). The fallacies inherent in the doctor-
patient analogy when extended to the field of management improvement technique
become, possibly, subtly but seriously compounded in a scheme for a pre-marital
purpose. As a condition to obtaining a marriage license, a medical examination is
generally required because of the health interest in protecting the parties against
infectious diseases. See, e.g., CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS
26 (1965), for a discussion of the medical examination requirement as a condition
precedent to the issuance of a marriage license. The latent danger in the use of the
language "legal check-up" consists in the possibility of the prospective licensees
identifying the two requirements, thereby frustrating at least one of the fundamental
purposes of a statutory legal check-up, namely, the impressing upon the individuals,
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protect that interest if the States' efforts hitherto have been ineffective 77
or outmoded.
7 8
Prior statutory regulation has consisted of both licensing conditions
precedent to the entry into marriage79 and divorce legislation. Cooling-off
statutes"° and interlocutory decrees8l are recognized, legitimate legal de-
vices designed to slow down the divorce rate while providing an oppor-
tunity for the human element to function so that the parties can preserve,
by themselves, those interests which the statutory devices were expected
to foster.8 2 A brief examination of these statutory measures and their
purpose should, it is hoped, emphasize the need for statutory preventive law.
The interlocutory decree was the earlier of the two statutory devices
aimed at providing an opportunity for, if not in fact actually effecting, a
reconciliation. One of the purposes of the statutes, ostensibly, was to
provide the opportunity to consider the conduct of the prevailing party
subsequent to the divorce, a necessity derived from the problems of proof
in a modern divorce defense.8 3 In upholding this device, the courts have
interpreted the legislative intent as not to make divorce difficult but to
assert the public policy against the "rapid acquisition of successive
spouses."' 4 A specific object of an interlocutory decree statute - the
protection of persons who enter into the marriage relation - coexists
with the broad general purpose of protecting the public interests.8 5
Lack of success, from the view-point of protecting the State interests
in marital integrity and permanency, led to a shift in statutory emphasis to
of the intangible but genuine state interest in the preservation and integrity of their
particular marriage and that the statutory requirement is something more than a
procedure that they must endure in common with all those seeking to enter into
the marital status.
77. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1948).
78. See Weinstein, Proposed Changes in the Law of Divorce, 27 Mo. L. Rtv. 307,
327-29 (1962) for a discussion of extant legislative procedures considered in the
light of contemporary demands.
79. See CLARK, op. cit. supra note 76, at 26, for a survey of the scope and degree
of pre-marital statutory regulation.
80. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 7b (1956)
Subject to the exceptions hereinafter in this Act provided, no complaint for
divorce shall be filed until after the expiration of 60 days from the day summons
is served or from the last day of publication of notice or, in cases in which
publication of notice or service of summons is waived, from the day defendant
appears in the cause in person or by counsel, provided, however, that plaintiff
shall file his or her complaint not later than 90 days from the day the praecipe is
filed or 70 days from the day summons is served or the last day of publication
of notice or the day defendant enters his or her appearance where publication
of notice or service of summons is waived.
81. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.37 (1957):
(1) When a judgment or decree of divorce from the bonds of matrimony is
granted so far as it affects the status of the parties it shall not be effective until
the expiration of one year from the date of the granting of such judgment
or decree....
(2) So far as said judgment or decree affects the status of the parties the
court shall have power to vacate or modify the same for sufficient cause shown,
upon its own motion, or upon the application of either party to the action, at any
time within one year from the granting of such judgment or decree. ...
82. See CLARK, op. cit. supra note 76, at 590.
83. See, e.g., Roddis v. Roddis, 18 Wis. 2d 118, 120, 118 N.W.2d 109, 111 (1962).
84. Id. at 121, 118 N.W.2d at 112.
85. Fraser v. Fraser, 334 Mass. 4, 133 N.E.2d 236 (1956).
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the cooling-off statute. Such legislation has been viewed as a valid exercise
of the State's police power to promote the public welfare and as a rea-
sonable rule regulating divorces6 before the parties become enmeshed
in the adversary proceedings attendant upon the filing of the petition.8 7
Challenges to such statutes as a means to legitimate legislative objectives
and on the grounds of vagueness and indefiniteness have been unsuccess-
ful.8 8 The courts, in upholding the cooling-off statutes, have considered
themselves as participating in the protection of the integrity and sanctity
of family life and as serving the best interests of the community by
attempting to reconcile the parties seeking a divorce or separation.8 9
Attacks on the grounds of State indifference to the human passion involved
in a divorce proceeding have likewise failed.90
Nevertheless, these statutory devices have failed to be effective. Apart
from the difficulties these procedures have had with the developing
pragmatic and realistic grounds for divorce - marriage failure9 ' - cur-
rent statistics on the divorce rate indicate in clearer fashion the measure
of their inadequacy. But unless our entire system of social values is to
be revolutionized, the legitimate interests which support such legislation
should not be frustrated.
A suggestion has been made to the N. Y. Legislature that there be
enacted a mandatory thirty-day "cooling-off" period before the issuing of
a marriage license. 2 Such a suggestion appears as the ultimate in a cry
of desperation. It fails, however, as a rational suggestion simply because
it would merely add to the formality of the State regulation of entry into
the marital status without incoporating cures for defects encountered
in the statutory measures of the same nature in the form of interlocutory-
decree and traditional "cooling-off" statutes. As such, the legislation
would be devoid of any practical meaning. Since, however, there are
valid State interests to be preserved and fostered, the etiology of the
recommendation is compelling in its logic. If the decision to obtain a
divorce follows a considerable period of deliberation by the parties and
is accountable in large measure for the frustration of existing statutory
devices, 93 and if the parties rights of marital privacy are constitutionally
secure from State interference after the formation of the marital status
86. See, e.g., People ex rel. Doty v. Connell, 9 Ill. 2d 390, 394, 137 N.E.2d 849,
852 (1956).
87. See, e.g., CLARK, op. cit. supra note 76, at 590.
88. See, e.g., People ex rel. Doty v. Connell, 9 Ill. 2d 390, 395-97, 137 N.E.2d
849, 853 (1956).
89. See Pashko v. Pashko, 63 Ohio L. Abs. 82, 85, 101 N.E.2d 804, 806 (C.P.
1951).
90. They also say that human passion is involved in this matter which is not
amenable to regulation by law. That, of course, is not sound thinking because it
is only through the exercise of discipline with respect to human passion that manhas evolved above the level of brute force and laws in many instances merely
reflect another discipline.
Id. at 90, 101 N.E.2d at 809.
91. See, e.g., DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
92. The Divorced Woman - American Style, Newsweek, Feb. 13, 1967, pp. 64-70.
93. See, e.g., GoOD, AFTXR DIVoRcn 138 (1956).
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until the parties themselves resort to formal legal machinery,94 then the
only time for the State to effectively assert its interests would be prior
to the formation of the status, and the statutory adoption of a pre-marital
"legal check-up" would meet the requirements of the "perceived need
test"9 5 of preventive law as a standard for proper legal action in a sphere
of legal interests.
VI. PRE-MARITAL LEGAL CHEcK-UP: THE PROPRIETY
Preventive law purposes necessarily involve a blending of facts and
law, and of law and facts.0 6 Therefore, in its pragmatic approach to the
prevention of legal disputes, even though there is demonstrated need
for revised statutory procedure prior to the creation of the marital
status, the propriety of such action must be shown before preventive law
will affirmatively support the enactment of one of its own techniques.
Preventive law clearly acknowledges "non-law suit" means of achieving
preventive law purposes and equally recognizes that the need and propriety
of such means increases as the source of potential legal dispute is identi-
fied with the family law relationship of the parties.9 7 Preventive law
would recognize that "divorce occupies a very particular place among the
predictable tragedies of living."98 It would then shape the observation
in a legal framework, such as, divorce or reconciliation proceedings are
a predictable source of legal procedures for nearly one-half of those
people who enter the marital status so that the avoidance of such legal
disputes is within the proper scope of preventive law purposes. But the
mere formulation of an answer does not necessarily provide a workable,
that is, a practical, legal approach.
The "traditional psychological basis of law that man is a respon-
sible being able to choose his own ends and make his own adjust-
ments" doesn't seem to hold up in a considerable proportion of
family court cases. Perhaps the trauma of domestic disharmony so
disturbs the emotions of the spouses that their judgment becomes
unsettled and they are unable to think. 9
Additionally, preventive law must contend with the assertion that "solu-
tions to marital problems [arise] only when people voluntarily come to
understand their problems." 00 The statutory pre-marital legal check-up,
however, could assimilate and digest the experience and truth of these
observations.
94. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964).
95. See Llewellyn, Some Realism 1224.
96. See Brown, The Law Office 947-48.
97. Id. at 944 n.12.
98. GOODP, op. cit. supra note 93, at 203.
99. Alexander, The Family Court - An Obstacle Race?, 19 U. PiTT. L. Rev. 602,
608 (1958).
100. Baum, A Trial Judge's Random Reflections on Divorce: The Social Problem
and What Lawyers Can Do About It, 6 J. FAMILY L. 61, 82 (1966).
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It is a fact that Americans are marrying young. Although it is
also a fact that the American divorce rate is the highest in the world,
it does not follow necessarily that the ages of those participating in
divorce has decreased correspondingly. 0 1 The fact of youth, however,
has been a prime consideration leading to significant revampings of legal
approaches to legal problems in other areas of family law. When the
modern minor appears before the juvenile court, it has been asserted
that a judge's approach based on "paternalistic notions of noblesse
oblige,' u0 2 is ineffective to accomplish the legal purposes of juvenile court.
Modern youth demand an individualistic and realistic appraisal of their
actions which have brought them before the court, in relationship to the
demands of law and of society upon them.10 3 The latter observation
would appear to be applicable, a fortiori, in the marital-divorce setting
where problems are compounded by the fact that irrespective of chrono-
logical maturity, many parties to a divorce are emotionally immature.104
And as the approach to legal proceedings has had to be revamped'0 5
because of the impact of modern social conditions and the inability of
existing juvenile proceedings to handle the problem and the child while
respecting the latter's constitutional rights, so also must the legal approach
to marital problems be similarly re-focused. The pre-marital legal check-
up, having as its motive the protection of vital State interests, presents
the ideal opportunity for this reorientation in approach.
It is not remarkable that the courts have had reason to observe that
a prime source of the legal dispute emanating from the modern marital
condition is the failure of the parties to the contract to marry to under-
stand the terms and conditions of that contract. 10 6 This absence of an
individualized pre-marital articulation of the elements of "one of life's
most important contracts" has been criticized by both legal'0 7 and non-
legal' 08 writers. Considering that law is a social institution and as such
is one of the fundamental social structures designed to specify "the role
obligations of the individual," particularly those which make immediate
demands on him;109 and, considering too that the basic purpose of
marriage licensing laws is to insure that persons who intend to marry
give formal notice of such intent and receive formal permission from
the State in order to protect the special interest of the State, the com-
munity, and society as a whole in the "creation and maintenance" of
101. Cf. text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
102. See Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 585,
595 (1965). See also Paulsen, The Juvenile Court and the Whole of the Law, 11
WAYN4 L. REv. 597, 609 (1965).
103. Paulsen, supra note 102, at 612.
104. See, e.g., Furlong, Dual Divorces and Conciliation in Contemporary Family
Law, 2 WILLAMmtrT L.J. 134, 136 (1962).
105. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See Comment, 12 VILL. L. REv. 803 (1967).
106. See, e.g., Heisler v. Heisler, 52 Ore. 691, 693, 55 P.2d 727, 729 (1936).
107. See, e.g., Furlong, supra note 104, at 141 n.33.
108. See, e.g., Cavanagh, Introduction, in FUNDAMENTAL MARRIAGE COUNSELING
xi (Cavanagh ed. 1963).
109. See GOODP, op. cit. supra note 93, at 204.
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the family," 0 the pre-marital legal check-up as a means of satisfying
these demands looms as not only desirable but also legally appropriate.
Another proper purpose could be served by requiring potential
entrants into the marital status to become legally aware of their legal
rights and duties vis-A-vis the State's interests and expectations, in order
to increase the stability of marriages - a consequent "common sense"
probability."' It has been estimated that at least one-half of the people
who launch the formal legal machinery via divorce suits are genuinely
hoping "that something will stop them before it is too late" because the
vast majority of those who initiate the divorce proceedings do so "without
thinking through what it may entail." 1" 2 It has also been strongly asserted
that a considerable number of people use the divorce process "as a means
of straightening out the other partner,"'1 feeling that they have secured
for themselves a "psychological advantage" by being the petitioner." 4
Alleviating the judiciary of demands such as these could hardly be denied
as a proper purpose of a statutory pre-marital legal check-up. The analogy
to what has been said by the proponents of change in the juvenile courts" 5
again appears relevant: "Some formality and proper attention to the
important procedural values need not interfere with the desired rehabili-
tative aim of the Court."" 6
Since it is "common knowledge" that the tendency of law-makers
has been to conserve and maintain the marriage relation by making various
changes in the law, 117 and since legislation "with respect to general charac-
teristics rather than with respect to a specific group of men" in which
the legislature has relied upon its "general knowledge of human psy-
chology" is permissible," 8 the propriety of legislation in accordance with
the goals of pre-marital preventive law purposes appears to be
unquestionable.
VII. LAWYERS AND THE PRE-MARITAL LEGAL CHECK-UP
That a legal approach to a particular contemporary social and legal
problem can be formulated, that a statutory procedure should be enacted,
and that a particular movement within the legal profession - preventive
law - can be relied upon to spearhead and to shape these legal develop-
ments may be conceded without answering a fundamental question: Are
lawyers capable of and should they execute this program as conceived?
The American legal tradition is historically lavish in its assertion
that lawyers are "officers of the court" whose admission to the bar is
110. McGuire, Civil Law Concerning Marriage, in FUNDAMENTAL MARRIAGE
COUNSMLING 414 (Cavanagh ed. 1963).
111. See GoODs, op. cit. supra note 93, at 97.
112. Rail, The King County Family Court, 28 WASH. L. Riv. 22, 26 (1953).
(Emphasis added.) See also Baum, supra note 100, at 77.
113. Furlong, supra note 104, at 138.
114. Id. at 164.
115. See notes 102-03 supra and accompanying text.
116. Paulsen, supra note 102, at 609. See also Furlong, supra note 104, at 156-57.
117. See Garrett v. State, 118 Neb. 373, 379, 224 N.W. 860, 863 (1929).
118. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1965).
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an exercise of judicial as well as ministerial power." 9 The corollary
of this concept is that lawyers are "officers whose duties relate almost
exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature.' 120 That the dockets of
almost all courts are overburdened to a distressing extent has been a
common condition of modern legal living for some time. 121 It is well
known that only a fragment of the controversies concerning property,
children, and alimony are litigated in a divorce action. 122 The expanding
awareness, assertion, and enforcement of both civil and individual rights;
the continuation of scientific discoveries having direct and indirect impacts
on modern legal process; the population explosion; the continued urbaniza-
tion of a nation; developments in criminal procedure and in criminal law
enforcement; and the organically expanding national economy, all have
been factors cited as sources of aggravating a presently barely tolerable
position of the courts and the legal profession1 23 and multiplying the
need for "lawyer skills.' 24 A result has been a demand that lawyers
contribute a "fair share" of their time to worthwhile civic and community
enterprises 125 and a call for more, and improved, legal talent in the field
consonant with the nature of the calling of a legal career.' 2
A blend of the "officer of the court" and the "fair share" concepts
demonstrates the preferred position of lawyers, presently and immediately,
to implement, in the midst of this maelstrom, a State program in the area of
the preservation of marital stability, integrity and sanctity. The statutory
pre-marital check-up would inject an individual, personalized approach to
119. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1867).
120. Id. at 379.
121. See, e.g., Miller, The Role and Responsibility of the Legal Profession in a
Changing Society, 33 TENN. L. REv. 433, 434 (1966).
122. See, e.g., Clark, Separation Agreements, 28 ROCKY MT. L. Rgv. 149 (1956).
123. Miller, supra note 121, at 434. Compare, Note, Neighborhood Law Offices:
The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L. Rgv. 805 (1967).
Cf. Bok, Emerging Issues in Social Legislation: Social Security, 80 HARV. L. Rgv.
717 (1967).
124. Freeman, The Role of Lawyer as Counselor, 7 WM. & MARY L. REv. 203,
204 (1966).
125. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 121, at 436. Cf. Veinstein, Proposed Changes
in the Law of Divorce, 27 Mo. L. Rgv. 307, 324-27 (1962). The contributions of
lawyers, at least in America, to an advancement of the general interests of the public,
[I~nclude furthering some of the most basic goals of modern society, such as
public understanding of the law and its implications, compliance with its terms,
reasonable access of private persons to government institutions and officials,
peaceful settlement of controversies, reasoned and open discussion of government
policy, and modification of law in accord with majority will but acceptable to
the minority.
JOHNSTONE & HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 6-7 (1967).
126. In private practice, the number of top-talent lawyers working in the in-
dividual and family maladjustment fields could be considerably increased if some
of the big corporate law firms were to open separate departments that would
take on a volume of typical family, juvenile, and even criminal matters of
nonwhite-collar character. With their access to outstanding legal talent and
their skill and care in working out legal problems, these firms could have a
very positive upgrading impact on such forms of practice, and they would prob-
ably make money too. They might also give real meaning to the professional
responsibility some of their members are so fond of talking about.
Id. at 565.
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the protection of State interests, the type of approach clamored for by
advocates for changes in divorce laws, 127 and by proponents of change
in the juvenile courts.128  The recommended pre-marital procedure of
having the State operate through its "officers of the court" who have met
State requirements for qualifying as representatives of its interests
would eventually and inevitably benefit the legal profession 1 29 and the
entire legal system.13° The necessary participation of lawyers in the
statutory scheme would be but an extension of the reliance that courts,
administrative tribunals, and government agencies have always placed
on them.131 Such extension, on a serviceable scale, would avoid any
need for a proliferation of government funds and agencies that could
otherwise stand as a deterrent to the State's taking effective and rapid
measures to discharge a responsibility to itself and to society.
Practically, charges must be contended with that law students,
and hence lawyers, are poorly, or at most indifferently, schooled in family
law problems, and that the nature of a lawyer's acquired skills makes
him eminently unfit for direct grappling with fundamental family prob-
lems even as they relate to law. 3 2 Preventive law, by fostering its
particular goals in the marital law fields and by its continued efforts in
other areas of law, should be more than adequately able to demonstrate
the irrationality of such fears and the myopia that has led to their unquali-
fied uttering.
Preventive law takes the position that the accurate prediction that a
law suit will not be commenced is more significant than the prediction of
the outcome of a suit that is commenced. 133 Defining "law suit," for our
limited purposes, as "divorce or reconciliation proceedings" the relation-
ship to preventive law has already been demonstrated. In legal terms,
this focus on the lawyer as counsellor, rather than advocate, is entirely
compatible with preventive law purposes as related to State and judicial
interests in marital litigation. For a lawyer, counsellor's rules are geared
to shaping a transaction while it is still capable of being shaped.13 4 The
transaction, in our context, is a marriage, and its shaping is limited to
making the parties aware of the State interests in their marriage and
advising them of pertinent legal procedures concerning legal obligations
127. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 125, at 327.
128. See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
129. The kind of benefits accruing to lawyers by their participation in the statutory
scheme of pre-marital check-ups are difficult to precisely articulate but should be
analogous to those foreseen for the juvenile court judge who
will be called upon more frequently to explain his findings of fact and law in
articulate, written opinions . . . [providing the] community . . . additional
means of appraising its juvenile court judge beyond the warmth of his handshake
and the correctness of his own family relations.
Ketcham, supra note 102, at 595.
130. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 125, at 125.
131. See, e.g., JOHNSTON4 & HoPsoN, op. cit. supra note 126, at 6.
132. See note 58 supra.
133. See Brown, The Law Office 944.
134. See generally Llewellyn, The Modern Approach.
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and rights available to those who have entered into the marital status -
in a refined, incisive and lawyer-like manner.
It is a fact that when marital friction has developed the counselling
services of an attorney have proved successful. 135 The explanation is
twofold: (1) people prefer to avoid any implications of neurosis or of need
for psychiatric treatment; and (2) the attorney's ability to give advice
and suggestions of an immediate and practical nature which result in an
increase of practical knowledge, thus improving marital situations.136 Why
this fact is true is not relevant to a legal discussion; but, because this fact
can be applied analogously to a procedure before marriage, designed to
reduce and to alleviate demands on legal interests and legal formal pro-
cedures when marital friction has developed, is germane to a consideration
of the preventive law purposes for achieving the premarital legal formality
as a means of achieving legitimate legal interests. This, coupled with the
fact that the lawyer, as counsellor, is accustomed to viewing rules of law
and legislation according to the nature and degree of danger which they
offer in the production of an undesirable legal result, 3 7 makes unquestion-
able the suitability of a statute implementing the skills and objectives of
the legal profession in furtherance of legitimate State, social and com-
munal interests. 138
VIII. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE PREVENTIVE LAW APPROACH
TO FAMILY LAW PROBLEMS
Opposition to preventive law approaches is inevitable. Resistance to
preventive law purposes in general has centered around a postulate of the
movement: "Intelligent effort to cut beneath old rules, old words, to get
sight of current things."'139 The rationale of such resistance applies with
greater force in relating preventive law to family law and may account,
in large measure, for the hitherto reluctance of the movement to extend
itself into the area of domestic relations as opposed to commercial, property
and labor relations. But if the purposes of preventive law are not merely
capable of defense but also warrant affirmative support and development,
and if the legitimate legal interests are capable of definition and of legal
treatment, then it seems inexplicable that greater emphasis has not been
devoted to an area of law which involves such a large percentage of litiga-
tion and the utilization of so much legal machinery.
135. See Reider, Problems in the Prediction of Marital Adjustment, in NEUROTIC
INTERACTION IN MARRIAGE 322-23 (1956).
136. Ibid. For a consideration of the importance of a favorable predisposition in a
"patient" in a commercial setting, see Tilles, Understanding the Consultant's Role, 39
HARV. Bus. Rpv. 87, 90 (Nov.-Dec. 1961).
137. See Llewellyn, The Modern Approach 168.
138. Such a rationale was manifest in the recently nationally-publicized case of
Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1967),
where the appellate court simultaneously and significantly considered problems of
human behavior within the family setting when it reversed the lower court on the
basis of a psychologist's trial testimony.
139. See Llewellyn, Some Realism 1223.
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Practical arguments of varying weight can be urged on three separate
grounds: (1) content of the legal check-up; (2) solicitation by lawyers;
and, (3) costs. The purposes of this comment have been to analyze
problems peculiar to an extension of preventive law measures into the
field of family law; to define a suggested modern technique of treating
particular legal problems; and, to demonstrate the desirability, propriety,
and necessity of such techniques. Considering the scope of the comment,
the listed practical objections to an enactment of a statutory pre-marital
legal check-up are irrelevant. However, it would be desirable to consider
aspects of these objections not only as a form of rebuttal or of anticipa-
tion but also to demonstrate that such criticisms, if postulated, would not
reach the essence of any conclusions expressed herein.
One of the curious anomalies of the consulting field is that there is
no word to describe what it is that the client does while he is being
helped. "To consult" is to ask someone else for advice or information.
But "consulting" reverses the action completely. It implies that all of
the activity is on the part of the person doing the helping - a particu-
larly pernicious semantic trap.140
Although the logical manner of discussing the use of consultants would
be to raise the issue of desired results,' 41 there is one aspect of the statutory
pre-marital check-up procedure that merits prior consideration. Family
law problems and their avoidance are peculiarly and constitutionally
"local."'1 42 The normal manner in which lawyers function as an entity is
through the local Bar Association. It is expected that the standard pro-
cedure would continue and that supervision of the statute's operation
could be reasonably controlled by close liaison between the State and
these local units of control. Cooperation by the public is expected and
it is also expected that participants would seek to capitalize on the knowl-
edge of the legal consultant in other spheres of law once the raison d'etre
of the check-up is accomplished; namely, the assertion of the State in-
terests and an exposition of the legal and governmental authorities avail-
able to those who espouse the marital status. This predictable blending
of the practical with the social and the legal would, in all probability,
relate to local legal difficulties or to a presentation of general legal ques-
tions to which a lawyer could respond with a high degree of certainty with-
out any advance preparation.
For example, entrants into the marital status require some place to
live and their alternatives, generally, are three-fold: (1) buy a home;
(2) lease; or (3) live with one of the parents. A portion of the legal
140. Tilles, supra note 136, at 91.
141. Ibid.
142. Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more
to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has
always been subject to the control of the legislature.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1887). In Loving v. Virginia, 87 Sup. Ct. 1817
(1967), the antimiscegenation case, it was the particular "statutory scheme" that was
held to be violative of the Constitution.
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check-up would be devoted to an adumbration of the legal aspects of the
several alternatives. Questions on insurance could be posed, particularly
in connection with any imminent realty or personalty investment. Ques-
tions of estate planning should be expected, varying in depth with the back-
ground and assets of the interviewees. If a young couple is present, the
many myths about lawyers and strange legal instruments called "wills"
may prompt a question concerning the advisability for either or both of
them. Queries may be directed at credit and impending items to be
purchased on conditional sale and the nature of joint rights on or after a
down-payment, on or after the marriage. Or questions might range into
the field of taxation and be as fundamental as whether a joint return
should be made for the year, or what system of household accounting of
expenses could be established in order to prepare for the filing of the
income statement. Or the image of the new wife who overdraws the
checking account and who is part of American folklore and humor may
lead into a discussion of the law of negotiable instruments; for example,
whether there is a legal requirement to discover and report unauthorized
signatures or alterations when the bank's statement of account is received.
The list of possible areas of discussion collateral to the consideration
of the statutory pre-marital requirements 1 43 is as limited and as wide as
the practice of law itself. The procedure should differ in the law office no
more than it already does, for that is the place where the client with knowl-
edge of the facts meets the lawyer with knowledge of the law.144 If the
nature of the questions that may arise during the check-up requires the
attention of a specialist, it would hardly be novel for a lawyer to recognize
a situation in which an "expert" is needed.
That preventive law is merely a disguise for solicitation and adver-
tising by members of the bar is a contention that has already been made.145
It could be renewed under the statutory system as proposed. The answer,
previously made by preventive lawyers, remains the same: How can it be
unethical for an attorney to give advice concerning cases, statutes or regu-
lations which affect his client's position ?146 In addition, if the "clients" of
a pre-marital check-up have a sufficiently defined legal position whereby
a lawyer's advice would provide a useful, albeit, incidental function, are
not incidental interests of the State also being furthered? Expanding legal
forces derived from a modern sense of decency and justice are not confined
to developments in the 1960's.14 7 During these years, however, the Supreme
Court has given impetus to the use of traditional legal machinery for the
accomplishment of traditionally non-legal purposes.148 The landmark case
of Griswold v. Connecticut, establishing the constitutionality of the marital
143. See text at p. 840 supra.
144. See, e.g., Brown, The Law Office 948.
145. Id. at 948-49.
146. Ibid.
147. See, e.g., Llewellyn, The Modern Approach 179.
148. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) ; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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rights of privacy, must have put to rest any good faith but misguided
charges of solicitation concerning the preventive law approaches to legal
problems centering on the marital relationship and its preservation, and the
preservation of the rights and duties flowing therefrom.
The costs of obtaining a medical examination under existing marriage
licensing laws has not been a valid argument against the State's imposition-
ing of the requirement upon the parties.1 49 However, the cost of legal
services, a standard complaint, 150 could, conceivably, be a legitimate legal
objection when indigents are considered. Considering, however, that legal
services for indigents under governmental programs have been extended
to their legal problems in family law despite contentions that legal service
functions for indigents should not be extended to "domestic relations
cases,"'' the argument loses much, if not all, of its force as applied to the
statutory pre-marital requirement, the necessary services for which are
within the scope of already extant legislation.1 2
IX. CONCLUSION
Proponents of a legal approach to divorce problems have suggested
a large number of benefits that would accrue to society as a whole'5 3 and
to each State in particular. 15 4 A preventive law approach to the problem
would be able to effectively accomplish the same results, or, at a minimum,
make their accomplishment easier and more feasible, and, at the same time,
affirmatively promote and preserve values and interests which merit con-
cern and attention by the law and its machinery.
The need for affirmative, responsible, and effective action by govern-
ment officials was dramatically re-stated by the Supreme Court in the
149. See generally, 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 25(b) (1948).
150. See, e.g., JOHNSTONEg & HOPSON, op. cit. supra note 125, at 7.
151. Note, supra note 123, at 826.
152. The law for indigents is not confined to family law problems other than the
pre-marital; for example, divorce, juvenile delinquency, and contact between these
areas of social concern is inevitable if not necessary. The proponents of the juvenile
court changes stated that "the presence of lawyers in juvenile courts will not only
provide better justice, but will also have a significant impact upon the legal and social
work professions." Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L.
REv. 585 (1965). Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court has agreed with this
proposition. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
153. See, e.g., Connolly, Divorce Proctors, 34 B.U.L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1954)
There are many other factors which promote the interest of the state in
marriage and divorce including the legitimacy and care of minor children; the
economic interest of the state if the children or the mother should have to be
placed on welfare or in a State institution; peace and harmony in the family and
community; settlement of property rights and the distribution of property on the
death or divorce of the parents; operation costs of court proceedings as to
alimony, contempt and custody of children; the possibility of reconciliation of
the parties in the interests of stabilizing the marriage relationship in general;
the protection of the absent or insane spouse or respondent; a hygienic interest
in the prevention of disease; assurance of a supply of children who will be
properly cared for and trained; a sort of old age insurance for the wife after her
childbearing age has passed; furnishing better living conditions for the family unit;
a stabilizing effect created by inter-family responsibility; regulation of distribu-
tion of wealth in a small sense due to the family wage earner; and, protection of
the good name and character of innocent co-respondents.
154. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 125, at 330-31.
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recent case of Camara v. Municipal Court155 where the requirement of
obtaining a search warrant was constitutionally imposed on health depart-
ment and other administrative officials: "It is surely anomalous to say that
the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth
Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."' 15
By analogy it is equally anomalous to expect that an expansion of the
grounds for divorce and a more comprehensive formalization and regulari-
zation of the law and procedures of divorce will provide the appropriate
machinery for protecting the overt State interest in the integrity and the
stability of marriages, and the individuals' perhaps latent interests in the
same objectives, and at the same time, insure that the rights of all the
parties will be respected.
Perhaps more than those who are technically styled as "preventive
lawyers" are concerned with the values incident to the marital status - or is
it merely coincident or circumstance that Griswold, Painter, Loving, Gault,
and Camara have followed closely on the heels of one another's holdings?
James F. Falco
155. 87 Sup. Ct. 1727 (1967).
156. Id. at 1732.
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